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SECURITIES REGULATION-FINANCIAL ADVISOR AS A "BIDDER"
IN ACTIONS ARISING
UNDER THE WILLIAMS ACT
City Capital Associates Limited Partnership v. Interco Inc. (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Congress adopted the Williams Act (the Act)' to ensure
that shareholders who are solicited in a tender offer will have sufficient
information to allow them to make an informed investment decision.2
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) subsequently promul-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1982). Prior to passage of the Wil-
liams Act, the federal securities laws did not regulate cash for stock tender of-
fers. I1A E. GADSBY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, § 7A.01, at 7A-5 (A. Sommer ed. 1988). To fill this
void, the Williams Act added subsections (d) and (e) to § 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and subsections (d), (e) and (f) to § 14 of
the Exchange Act. Id. Section 13(d) requires any person who acquires greater
than a five-percent beneficial ownership interest in any equity security registered
under the Exchange Act to file a form Schedule 13D with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) within 10 days. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 11.10, at 337-38 (1985). Section 14(d) requires registration of all
"tender offer material" and other information as the SEC may require where a
person has acquired more than a five-percent beneficial ownership in the com-
pany. Id. § 11.14, at 355. Regulation 14D provides the additional filing and
disclosure requirements of the SEC under § 14(d). Id. For a further discussion
of the SEC rules promulgated under § 14(d), see infra notes 3-4 and accompany-
ing text.
2. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811 [hereinafter WILLIAMS ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
The legislative history provides:
The persons seeking control . . . have information about them-
selves and about their plans which, if known to investors, might sub-
stantially change the assumptions on which the market price is based.
This bill is designed to make the relevant facts known so that share-
holders have a fair opportunity to make their decision.
Id. at 2813.
The purpose of the Williams Act is to "insure that public shareholders who
are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to re-
spond without adequate information." Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 58 (1975); accord Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc.,
599 F.2d 1140, 1144 (2d Cir. 1979) (substantial need for investment information
in cash tender offer); Koppers Co. v. American Express, 689 F. Supp. 1371,
1382-83 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (Williams Act added by Congress to close gap in 1933
and 1934 Acts which did not require cash tender offer disclosures); see also Anno-
tation, Construction of 1968 Amendments to § 14 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Dealing with Tender Offers, 6 A.L.R. FED. 906, 907 (1971) (Williams Act intended
by Congress to be directed at cash tender offers).
While the stated purpose of the Williams Act was to provide shareholders
with information and not to favor the target corporation's management, Con-
gress recognized that the disclosure requirements would prevent some tender
(635)
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gated Regulation 14D 3 to establish the specific information which the
bidder in a tender offer must disclose. 4 The term "bidder" is defined by
the SEC in rule 14d-l(b)(1) as a person who makes or on whose behalf a
tender offer is made.5 While the definition of a bidder in rule 14d-
l(b)(l) appears to be clear, the district courts have had difficulties in
applying it to the various participants in tender offers." The controversy
appears to be a product of the unprecedented level of participation by
offers. See I IA E. GADSBY, supra note 1, § 7A.01, at 7A-6 to -6.1. The House
Report on the Williams Act provides in part:
The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of man-
agement or in favor of the person making the takeover bid....
While the bill may discourage tender offers or other attempts to
acquire control by some who are unwilling to expose themselves to the
light of disclosure, the committee believes this is a small price to pay for
adequate investor protection.
WILLIAMs ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 2813.
3. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to -101 (1988).
4. The primary disclosure document under Regulation 14D is Schedule
14D-l. See id. §§ 240.14d-3(a)(1), -100. Schedule 14D-I requires, among other
disclosures, (1) the identity and background of the bidder, Item 2; (2) any past,
present, or proposed contracts, transactions, negotiations or relationships with
the target company, Item 3; (3) the sources of funds for the tender offer, Item 4;
and (4) the purpose of the tender offer and the bidder's plans for the target,
Item 5. See T. HAZEN, supra note 1, § 11.14, at 356-57.
5. Specifically, rule 14d-1(b)(1) provides: "The term 'bidder' means any
person who makes a tender offer or on whose behalf a tender offer is made:
Provided, however, that the term does not include an issuer which makes a
tender offer for securities of any class of which it is the issuer." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-l(b)(1) (emphasis omitted). Schedule 14D defines a "bidder" as sim-
ply "any person on whose behalf a tender offer is made." Id. § 240.14d-100
(General Instruction (G)).
6. See, e.g., MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, 871 F.2d 212, 220 (1st
Cir. 1989) (firm acting as financial advisor, dealer manager and equity partici-
pant is bidder despite less than majority interest in acquisition vehicle, where
firm is involved from beginning and probably indispensible to success of tender
offer); Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 698 F. Supp. 1169, 1179 (D. Del. 1988) (finan-
cial advisors not bidders absent evidence of control over tender offer), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988); Koppers Co. v. American
Express, 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1390 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (investment banker which
"play[ed] a central participatory role" and became "a motivating force fueling
the formation and capitalization" of tender offer deemed bidder); Arkansas Best
Corp. v. Pearlman, 688 F. Supp. 976, 980-81 (D. Del. 1988) (motivating and
controlling individuals behind several corporations and partnerships formed
solely to make tender offer are bidders); Warnaco, Inc. v. Galef, No. B-86-146,
slip op. at 14 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 1986) (investors who contribute own shares of
target stock to form acquisition vehicle without further direct capitalization not
bidders), aif'd, 800 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, 621 F.
Supp. 804, 814 (D. Del. 1985) (majority shareholder in parent of acquisition
vehicle not bidder without direct capitalization of tender offer); Van Dusen Air,
Inc. v. API. Ltd. Partnership, No. 4-85-1256, slip op. at 4 (D. Minn. Sept. 20.
1985) (person who merely loans funds for tender offer not bidder); Pabst Brew-
ing Co. v. Kalmanovitz, 551 F. Supp. 882, 892 (D. Del. 1982) (individuals who
"are the primary motivating force behind the formation and capitalization" of
tender offer are bidders); Gray Drug Stores v. Simmons, 522 F. Supp. 961, 966-
67 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (mere fact that acquisition vehicle may transfer rights to
636
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financial advisors in recent tender offers, and the tactics utilized by in-
cumbent management to prevent takeovers. 7 The issue most frequently
arises where the financial advisor goes beyond its traditional advisory
role and takes a substantial equity position in the acquisition vehicle.,
In CitY Capital Associates Limited Partnership v. Interco Inc. ,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a financial advi-
sor and dealer manager"' of a tender offer was not a bidder subject to
the Regulation 14D disclosure requirements, even though it had the
right to purchase a substantial minority interest in the acquiring
corporation. '
II. DIscusSION
In City Capital, City Capital Associates Limited Partnership (City
Capital) made a hostile takeover bid for control of Interco Incorporated
(Interco).' 2 The tender offer required a total of $2.6 billion in financ-
purchase tendered shares of target stock to affiliates does not make affiliates
bidders).
7. See Koppers Co. v. American Express, 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1390 (W.D. Pa.
1988) (citation omitted). The district court stated, "[t]here seems to be no dis-
pute that this is the first time that a broker-dealer has become so intimately in-
volved in a tender offer." Id. The court noted that "Shearson's role far
surpasses that of the typical investment banker. Not only has Shearson assisted
Mr. Beazer in developing a financial structure intended to enable him to acquire
Koppers, Shearson has agreed to be a major equity participant in the takeover
vehicles." Id.
8. An acquisition vehicle is a business entity created for the sole purpose of
receiving the target's tendered shares. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v.
Interco, Inc., 860 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 1988). Often, instead of merely providing
advisory services in takeover situations, these advisors or dealer managers ac-
quire an equity position in the acquisition vehicle. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v.
Disney, 698 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Del. 1988) (financial advisors and co-dealer man-
agers which received option to purchase 21% of equity interest in acquisition
vehicle held not to be bidders); Koppers Co. v. American Express, 689 F. Supp.
1371 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (investment banker which acquired slightly less than 50%
of common equity of acquisition vehicle held to be bidder); cf. McAtee, The Role
of the Dealer Manager in the Disclosure Process, 32 Bus. LAw. 1331, 1331 (1977)
("Currently, there is relatively low risk of liability under Federal securities laws
for an investment banker whose sole capacity in a tender offer is advising on
questions of offensive or defensive strategy.").
9. 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988). This case was argued before Chief Judge
Gibbons and Circuit Judges Stapleton and Weis. Id. at 61. Judge Stapleton
wrote the majority opinion and Judge Weis dissented. Id.
10. See McAtee, snpra note 8, at 1331. The dealer manager is one of many
roles played by the investment banker in a tender offer. Id. The dealer man-
ager's primary responsibility is to develop a successful takeover strategy. Id. See
also Chris Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.) (defining duties
of dealer manager to shareholders), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
11. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 65. For a further discussion of the court's hold-
ing and rationale, see infra notes 22-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of judge Weis' dissent, see infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
12. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 61-62. City Capital was a limited partnership
structured with two limited partners, each owning a 1% interest, and two gen-
3
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ing, of which $1.225 billion was to be in the form of bank financing from
a syndicate of banks, led by Chase National Bank (Chase).13 The re-
maining $1.375 billion was to be raised through the sale of preferred
stock in the acquisition vehicle, Cardinal Acquisition Corp. (Acquisition)
by Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. (Drexel).1 4 Drexel was also engaged
eral partners, City GP I, Inc. (City GP I) and City GP II, Inc. (City GP II), each
with a 49% interest. Id. at 61. City GP I was wholly owned by Steven M. Rales,
and his brother Mitchell P. Rales was the sole shareholder of City GP II. Id.
Additionally, City Capital owned all of the stock of Cardinal Holdings Corpora-
tion (Holdings), which in turn held all of the stock of Cardinal Acquisition Cor-
poration (Acquisition), the acquisition vehicle created for the sole purpose of
acquiring Interco's stock. Id. For a further discussion of Acquisition's role in
the tender offer, see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
On July 18, 1988, City Capital, pursuant to its obligations under the Wil-
liams Act, notified the SEC that it had acquired an 8.10% ownership interest in
Interco's stock. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 61. On July 27, 1988, City Capital pro-
posed a friendly merger with Interco for $64 per share, and later increased its
offer to $70 per share. Id. Interco's board of directors rejected both offers as
inadequate. Id. Two days later, City Capital retained Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc. as its exclusive financial advisor and dealer manager. Id. at 63 n.4. On
August 15, 1988, City Capital, City GP I, City GP II, Holdings, Acquisition,
Steven Rales, and Mitchell Rales filed Schedules 13D and 14D-1 to advise the
SEC of their hostile takeover bid for Interco. Id. at 61-62.
13. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 62. The use of bank financing in a tender offer
is regulated by the Federal Reserve System and the SEC through the establish-
ment of margin requirements. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 7, 15
U.S.C. § 78g (1982). Under § 7 of the Exchange Act, the current margin re-
quirement permits a bidder to finance up to one-half of a stock purchase by
credit, using the purchased stock as collateral. Id. See also Floyd,Junk Bonds: Do
They Have Value?, 35 EMORY L.J. 921, 956 (1986).
Prior to 1986, a popular method of skirting the margin requirements in cor-
porate takeovers involved the issuance of high-yield, high-risk "junk" bonds by
the acquisition vehicle. Id. Because an acquisition vehicle is nothing more than
a shell corporation, the economic reality is that such bonds were secured entirely
with the value of the tendered shares. Id. at 957. This is the exact situation that
the margin requirements were designed to prevent. Id. In 1986, the Federal
Reserve Board attempted to limit the use ofjunk bonds by restricting shell cor-
porations from financing more than 50% of the takeover price with such bonds.
See 12 C.F.R. § 207.112 (1988). Commentators have viewed the rule as ineffec-
tive due to the many methods of avoiding it. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Van-
agers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 5 n.9 (1986) (citing
Smith, Fed Rule Restricting the Use of Junk Bonds in Takeovers Is by Mlost Accounts
Ineffective, Wall St.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 47, col. 3). "One tactic is to issue a junk'
preferred stock and then later refinance it with a debt issuance in connection
with the follow-up merger." Id. (citing Smith, supra, at 47, col. 3).
14. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 62. Acquisition was created by City Capital for
the sole purpose of acquiring the Interco stock. Id. at 61. As is common with
tender offers, Acquisition's obligation to purchase the tendered shares was con-
ditioned on, inter alia, 75% of the outstanding shares of Interco stock being ten-
dered, including the shares already owned by City Capital. Id. at 62. If' the
requisite number of shares were tendered, City Capital planned to merge In-
terco with Acquisition in a cash-out merger at a price equal to the tender offer
price, excluding only those shares owned by Acquisition, its affiliates, or share-
holders who had perfected their appraisal rights. Id.
The finance plan for the transaction included the issue of both preferred
4
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as the exclusive financial advisor and dealer manager, for which Drexel
received substantial fees and an option to purchase between twenty-nine
and thirty-six percent of the common equity of Acquisition for itself and
its designees."'
City Capital initiated suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware seeking a preliminary injunction against the en-
forcement of Delaware's anti-takeover statute' 6 in this transaction on
the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. 17 Interco filed a
and common stock in Acquisition, with City Capital retaining a minimum of 63%
of the common stock in order to maintain control of Acquisition. Id. For a dis-
cussion of the use of preferred stock to avoid margin requirements, see supra
note 13.
15. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 62. Drexel's fee for placement of the preferred
stock was to be $12 million if the takeover was successful or $6 million plus 15%
of the profits from any subsequent sale of the Rales' Interco stock if the tender
offer failed. Id. In addition, Drexel was to receive a 1.125% fee for funds se-
cured through written commitments, and between 3% and 5.25% of the gross
proceeds from the sale of debt or equity securities it had underwritten. Id.
Drexel also had the right to purchase between 29% and 36% of the common
equity of Acquisition for itself or its designees. Id. The rights to the common
equity were granted, in part, to allow Drexel to offer prospective investors com-
mon stock as a "sweetener" to make the preferred shares of Acquisition more
marketable. Id. However, Drexel was entitled to retain for itself up to one-half
of the 36% of the common equity. Id. Drexel was to receive an additional fee of
$2 million for its exclusive financial advisory service and $1 million for acting as
the dealer manager. Id.
16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988). Section 203(a) provides in
pertinent part:
[A] corporation shall not engage in any business combination with any
interested stockholder for a period of 3 years following the date that
such stockholder became an interested stockholder, unless (1) prior to
such date the board of directors of the corporation approved either the
business combination or the transaction which resulted in the stock-
holder becoming an interested stockholder; [or] (2) upon consumma-
tion of the transaction which resulted in the stockholder becoming an
interested stockholder, the interested stockholder owned at least 85%
of the voting stock of the corporation outstanding at the time the trans-
action commenced [excluding from outstanding shares those shares
owned by directors, officers, and specified employee stock plans] ....
Id.
17. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
1551 (D. Del.), aff'd, 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988). City Capital named Delaware's
Attorney General and Secretary of State, and Interco in the suit seeking prelimi-
nary and permanent injunctions against application of the Delaware statute. Id.
at 1552. City Capital challenged the statute with three constitutional arguments.
First, City Capital contended that under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, the state statute infringed on the shareholder's ability to
make a decision to tender or retain his shares, contrary to the purposes of the
Williams Act. Id. at 1555. Second, City Capital argued that the statute inter-
fered with the ability to conduct a nationwide tender offer, and therefore vio-
lated the Commerce Clause. Id. Finally, City Capital argued that the statute
made a standardless delegation of legislative authority to the boards of directors
in Delaware, and was therefore invalid tinder the Due Process Clause of tile
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1555-56. The district court only considered the
5
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counterclaim alleging that the tender offer proposed by City Capital vio-
lated the Williams Act and the regulations promulgated under the Act.' i
Specifically, Interco asserted that City Capital's tender materials failed
to disclose violations of both the Federal Reserve Board's margin re-
quirements and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and that Drexel and Chase
were bidders under the Williams Act regulations. l ' The district court
last argument because the other two had been previously rejected in that dis-
trict. Id. at 1554-55 (citing R.P. Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc.,
686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988); BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D.
Del. 1988)).
The district court found that § 203 was not an improper delegation of gov-
ernmental authority because the board of directors, not the state legislature, had
the sole authority to approve mergers. Id. at 1556. Therefore, there was no
delegation of authority. Id.
18. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 62.
19. City Capital, 696 F. Supp. at 1556. Interco's margin requirement argu-
ment centered on the classification of Acquisition's preferred stock as debt or
equity. Id. at 1557. If the preferred stock were classified as debt, it would be
violative of the Federal Reserve Board's interpretive ruling forbidding a shell
corporation from issuing debt securities in excess of the margin requirements.
Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 207.112(b), (e) (1987)). For a discussion of the use of
junk preferred stock to avoid margin requirements, see supra note 13.
The district court in City Capital never reached the merits of the margin re-
quirement issue because it found that Interco lacked standing to raise it. City
Capital, 696 F. Supp. at 1558. The court noted that where a party does not have
standing to litigate the margin requirement issue directly under § 7 of the Ex-
change Act, it should not be permitted to do so indirectly under § 14 of the
Exchange Act. Id. Under § 7 of the Exchange Act, there may be an implied
cause of action for a borrower against his bank or broker dealer where the bor-
rower was extended credit in violation of the margin requirements. E. ARANOW,
H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 160 (1977). A target corporation and its shareholders would not be
able to avail themselves of a § 7 cause of action because they were not a party to
the loan transaction creating the margin violation. Id. Similarly, Interco and its
shareholders were "strangers" to the transactions which allegedly created the
margin violation in City Capital and, therefore, would not have direct standing to
challenge the violation under § 7 of the Exchange Act. City Capital, 696 F. Supp.
at 1556. However, Interco's cause of action was against City Capital for failure
to disclose the margin violation under § 14(e) of the Williams Act. Id. Interco, as
the target corporation, arguably would have standing for this action in some
federal courts under the theory that § 14(d) and (e) of the Williams Act requires
disclosure of all material facts related to the tender offer, and that a violation of
the margin requirement would constitute a material fact. Id. In fact, the indirect
standing argument appears to have been recognized in the District Court of Del-
aware until the City Capital case was decided. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry
Pride, 621 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1985). The Revlon court stated, "[i]t is settled
in this circuit that there is no private right of action under Section 7 of the Ex-
change Act or the regulations thereunder." Id. at 814 (citing Walck v. American
Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778, 788 (3d Cir. 1982)). However, the Revlon court rec-
ognized an indirect cause of action giving "standing to allege failure to disclose
margin violations." Id. (citing Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz, 551 F. Supp.
882, 885 (D. Del. 1982); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532,
554 n.28 (D. Del. 1975)). It is interesting to note thatJudge Farnan wrote both
the Revlon and City Capital opinions.
Interco's second contention was that the Rales brothers constructed a series
640
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denied Interco's motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that In-
terco had failed to show a likelihood of success on any part of its coun-
terclaim, and that neither Drexel nor Chase was a bidder.20 Interco
appealed on the single issue of whether Drexel was a bidder under the
Williams Act regulations.
2 1
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
addressed Interco's contention that Drexel had gained sufficient control
over the tender offer to convert Drexel from an advisor into a bidder.
2 2
In rejecting Interco's argument, the court emphasized two factors which
tended to diminish the degree of Drexel's control. First, the court
pointed to the fact that City Capital had already made a friendly merger
proposal to Interco's board of directors and, upon rejection, decided to
pursue the tender offer prior to engaging Drexel's services. 23 Second,
the court classified Drexel's interest as merely an investment in the ac-
quisition vehicle, concluding that since City Capital would retain a mini-
mum of sixty-three percent of the common stock of Acquisition, Drexel
of shell corporations in an effort to avoid the filing requirements of tile Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982) (Hart-Scott).
City Capital, 696 F. Supp. at 1559. Hart-Scott applies to an entity in control (de-
fined as 50% or more ownership) of the entity making the acquisition. Id. (citing
16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(l), (b)(1) (1987)). As previously noted, the Rales brothers
each owned 49% of City Capital, with the remaining 2% held by two employees.
Id. Although the court recognized that this structure was suspicious, it con-
cluded that Interco failed to show that it was illegal. Id.
This Casebrief will focus on Interco's third assertion that Drexel had be-
come a "bidder" under the Williams Act and the regulations promulgated under
the Act.
20. City Capital, 696 F. Supp. at 1558. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a
party must establish four elements: (1) a reasonable probability of success on
the merits of the claim, (2) irreparable harm, (3) denial of the injunction would
harm the party seeking the injunction more than the enjoined party and (4) the
injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 1554. The district court found that
Interco did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits
and, therefore, failed the first element. Id. at 1558. The district court did note,
however, that Drexel had come "dangerously close to the point at which [the]
Court would not hesitate to classify Drexel as a bidder." Id.
21. Cit y Capital, 860 F.2d at 63.
22. Id. As evidence of Drexel's control over the tender offer, Interco
pointed to the substantial fees Drexel would be paid in connection with the
tender offer and the option to purchase between 29%-36% of Acquisition's
common stock for itself and its designees. Id. The court stated that "the former
evidence is irrelevant to the 'bidder' issue and the latter is insufficient to make
Drexel a 'bidder.'" Id.
23. Id. Specifically, City Capital retained Drexel after it had already devel-
oped its tender offer strategy, made a merger proposal to Interco, purchased
over three million shares of Interco stock, filed a Schedule 131) with the SEC.
and filed two lawsuits against Interco and its board of directors. Id. at 63 n.4.
However, it is important to note that Drexel was retained by City Capital only
two days after its friendly merger proposal was rejected by Interco's board of
directors and 18 days before the hostile tender offer began. Id. at 61-62 & 63
7
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could not be in control of the tender offer. 2 4
The Third Circuit implicitly acknowledged, however, that a minor-
ity shareholder could become a bidder under some circumstances.
2 5
The court distinguished the decision in Koppers Co. v. American Express,2";
which held that Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (Shearson), an indirect
owner of a substantial minority interest (46.1 %) in the acquisition vehi-
cle, had become a bidder through its active participation in the tender
offer.2 7 The City Capital court's distinction was based on Shearson's
right to elect two members to the board of directors of the acquisition
vehicle. 28 According to the court, this representation gave Shearson ad-
ditional control over the tender offer, which Drexel did not have in City
Capital.29'
Moving from the "control" aspect of Interco's argument, the court
next analyzed the definition of the term "bidder."'30 The Third Circuit
began its analysis of the regulatory definitions of the term "bidder" by
stating that deference should be given to the SEC interpretations of the
Williams Act. 3 1 The court first looked to the definition of the word
24. Id. at 63. The court noted that while the Rales brothers agreed to pay
Drexel's substantial fees and granted Drexel the option to purchase a large eq-
uity position in Acquisition, there was no evidence that they ever gave up control
of the tender offer to Drexel. Id.
25. Id. at 63 n.5. By distinguishing Koppers Co. v. American Express, 689
F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1988), in which a minority shareholder was deemed a
bidder, the City Capital court apparently would classify a minority shareholder as
a bidder where it had the right to elect some directors. City Capital, 860 F.2d at
63 n.5. The court also stated that "[w]here a stockholder of a corporation mak-
ing a tender offer is in a position to have a significant impact on the future of
that corporation, information about the stockholder may well be material to a
decision of stockholders of the target ...." Id. at 65 (citing Prudent Real Estate
Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140, 1147 (2d Cir. 1979)).
26. 689 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
27. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 63 n.5; see Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1389-90. In
Koppers, the investment banker, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., assumed multi-
ple roles "at an early stage in the tender offer." Id. at 1389. The court discussed
a number of factors demonstrating the level of participation by Shearson. Id.
The court pointed to Shearson's (1) enormous cash investment in the acquisi-
tion vehicle, (2) involvement in the tender offer at an early stage, (3) significant,
yet not controlling equity holdings and (4) large fees and expected future fees
from the tender offer and subsequent restructuring. Id. at 1389-90.
28. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 63 n.5. Shearson, through a subsidiary, SL-
Merger, owned 95.1% of the Class B stock entitling it to elect two Class B direc-
tors. Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1389. For a discussion of the rights of these Class
B shareholders and directors, see infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
29. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 63 n.5. The CitY Capital court reasoned that
"the equity securities held by the Shearson Lehman interests entitled them to
representation on the board of the surviving company and the [Koppers] court
viewed the Shearson Lehman interests as sharing control of the board with
others." Id.
30. For the text of' rule 14d-I (b)(l) defining a "bidder," see supra note 5
and accompanying text.
31. Cit) Capital, 860 F.2d at 64. The court stated that it would defer to the
SEC's interpretation of the Williams Act and the regulations promulgated there-
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"bidder" provided in rule 14d-l(b)(l) and Schedule 14D-1. 3 2 The court
acknowledged that the language "any person on whose behalf a tender
offer is made," which is contained in both the rule and schedule, could
be interpreted to include the stockholders of a corporation making the
tender offer.3 3 However, the court then referred to the usage of the
term "bidder" within the context of Schedule 14D-1 and determined
that bidder status was intended by the SEC to be limited to the actual
purchaser of the tendered securities. 34 The court referred to Item 9,
which is an instruction on how to complete a portion of Schedule 14D-l,
as the clearest evidence that the term "bidder" was interpreted by the
SEC to exclude shareholders of the acquiring corporation, even where
the corporation was merely an acquisition vehicle. 35 Item 9 requires a
non-natural person in control of the bidder to make current and ade-
quate financial disclosures. 36 From this distinction between the bidder
and the entity in control of the bidder, the court concluded that the SEC
intended that only the actual entity receiving the tendered shares should
under, so long as there was no conflict between the interpretation and congres-
sional intent. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Counsel,
467 U.S. 837 (1984); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)). See Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-43; Chenery, 332 U.S. at 209.
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court applied a two-part test to de-
termine ifjudicial deference to administrative interpretation was required. Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 842. First, if Congress had expressed a clear intent in the
statute, that intent controls over any judicial or agency interpretation. Id. at
842-43. Second, if Congress had not spoken directly on the issue, the court
must defer to the agency interpretation so long as it is "based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Id. at 843. See also Starr,Judicial Review in the Post-
Chevron Era, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 283, 296 (1986) ("[T]he Court made it clear that
if its two conditions for deferring to the agencies are met, 'a court may not sub-
stitute its own construction' for that of the agency.") (citing Chevron) (footnotes
omitted).
The Supreme Court in Chenery held that administrative judgments are enti-
tled to deference regardless of whether the court agreed with the result or not.
Cheney, 332 U.S. at 209. The Court reasoned that an agency judgment "is the
product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the
problem, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts." Id.
32. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 64. For the text of rule 14d-I(b)(1) and Sched-
ule 14D-1, see snpra note 5.
33. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 64.
34. Id. For a discussion of Schedule 14D requirements, see snpra note 4.
35. Cit'y Capital, 860 F.2d at 64. Item 9 of Schedule 14D provides:
Where the bidder is other than a natural person and the bidder's finan-
cial condition is material to a decision by a security holder of the sub-
ject company whether to sell, tender or hold securities being sought in
the tender ofHer, furnish current, adequate financial information con-
cerning the bidder; Provided, That if the bidder is controlled by another
entity which is not a natural person and has been formed for the pir-
pose of' making the tender ofIer, furnish current, adequate financial in-
formation concerning such parent.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1988) (emphasis in original).
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.141-100 (General Instruction (G), Item 9).
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be the bidder.3 7
The Third Circuit next stressed the importance of predictability in
the area of securities law.38 The court stated that the regulations
promulgated under the Williams Act should give fair notice of the dis-
closures required by the Act and, therefore, the court would read the
regulations in light of their plain meaning. 39 The court concluded that
the regulations and Schedule 14D-1 would not "communicate to any
lawyer or layman attempting to comply with the law that financials are
required from an entity that ultimately will be a minority stockholder in
a corporation making a tender offer." 40 In addition, the court pointed
out that even if Drexel were a bidder, Item 9 required disclosure of fi-
nancial information only if it were material to the target shareholder's
decision to tender its stock. 4 1 The court stated that where the party in
question is not the controlling entity, there must be at least a clear show-
ing that the disclosure would materially affect the target shareholder's
investment decision. 42
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Weis argued that the statutory provi-
sions of the Williams Act itself should guide the court's analysis, rather
than the regulations and other "appendages" promulgated under the
Act. 43 Judge Weis argued that the SEC's use of the term "bidder" must
37. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 64. For a further discussion of the court's inter-
pretation of Item 9, see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
38. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 64. The court stated that it "must be con-
strained by a fair reading of the text of the regulations even if [the court] might
reach a different result were [it] charged with the responsibility of promulgating
regulations to implement the Williams Act." Id.
39. Id. For a discussion of the disclosures required under the regulations,
see supra note 4.
40. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 65.
41. Id. Regardless of whether § 14(d) or (e) specifically requires disclosure,
all material information must be disclosed. Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, 621 F.
Supp. 804, 808 (D. Del. 1985) (citing SEC Release No. 33-5844 [1977-78 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,256 at 88,379 n.22 (July 21, 1977)).
The dissent in City Capital suggested that the standard for materiality established
by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976), is the proper test for materiality in this case. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 70
(Weis, J., dissenting) (citing TSC AIdustries, 426 U.S. at 449). Under the TSC
Industries standard, if the reasonable investor would take the information into
consideration in making his investment decision, the information is deemed ma-
terial. Id. (WeisJ., dissenting). Because the district court did not evaluate the
materiality of the undisclosed financials against the standard, the dissent urged
that the case be remanded to decide this issue. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
42. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 65. The court, in dictum, stated that if Drexel
had acquired a controlling interest in Acquisition, a presumption that Drexel's
financials were material information to Interco's shareholders might be appro-
priate. Id. However, in the present case, Drexel could only receive a minority
interest and, therefore, no presumption of materiality was required. Id. The
court concluded that Interco had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that
)rexel's financial statements would be of material interest to its stockholders in
responding to the tender offer. Id.
43. Id. (Weis, j.. dissenting). The Williams Act provides in pertinent part:
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be read consistently with the language of the Williams Act, and not in a
manner which would narrow the scope of the Act.4 4 Specifically, the
dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Item 9, finding
that it limited the scope of the Williams Act. 4 5 Instead, Judge Weis read
Item 9 as a cautionary instruction against any attempt by a bidder to
evade the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act by using a shell
corporation to carry out the transaction. 4 6 In support of his interpreta-
tion of Item 9, Judge Weis relied on the statutory language of the Wil-
liams Act which forbids a person from indirectly acquiring a beneficial
interest in the target without making the required disclosures. 4 7 Under
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly .... to make a
tender offer for ... any class of any equity security ... if, after consum-
mation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the benefi-
cial owner of more than five per centum of such class, unless . . .such
person has filed with the Commission a statement containing ... such
additional information as the Commission may by rules and regulations
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982) (citations omitted).
For a discussion of §§ 13(d) and 14(d) of the Williams Act, see supra note 1.
44. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 66 (Weis,J., dissenting) ("[T]he agency's use of
the word 'bidder' must be read in harmony with the statutory language and not
as an attempt to narrow the scope of the Act .... ). Judge Weis observed that
the Williams Act provided a broad definition of the term "person." The defini-
tion of person under the Act provides that "[w]hen two or more persons act as a
partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or
group shall be deemed a 'person' for purposes of this subsection." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(2). Thus, the dissent concluded that "the word 'person' includes not
only its plural, but entities such as partnerships, syndicates and 'groups' as
well." City Capital, 860 F.2d at 66 (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(2)).
In interpreting the statute in conjunction with the SEC's definition of the
term "bidder," the dissent pointed to an SEC Release which explained that the
terms "bidder" and "subject company" were used to provide "short-hand refer-
ences to the principal participants in a tender offer and avoid certain pejorative
terms now commonly used to describe participants in a tender offer." Id. (Weis,
J., dissenting) (citing Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, [1979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,935, at 81,216 (Feb. 5, 1979)).
45. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 68 (Weis, J., dissenting). As mentioned previ-
ously, the majority used Item 9 in an attempt to glean an SEC interpretation of
rule 14d-l(b)(1). Id. at 64. Because Item 9 drew a distinction between the "bid-
der" and the entity in control of the "bidder," the majority inferred that the SEC
considered only the entity receiving the tendered shares as the "bidder." Id.
For a further discussion of the majority's position, see supra notes 30-37 and
accompanying text.
46. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 68-69 (WeisJ., dissenting) (interpreting Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5844, 11977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
81,256, at 88,380 (July 21, 1977)) ("ITihe Commission will not tolerate schemes
to circumvent the requirements of Item 9 by relying on this proviso.").
47. Id. at 69 (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(I)). Judge
Weis stated that "It he formation of a shell corporation for the Iurpose of mak-
ing a tender without disclosing who or what is behind the legal facade would be
a blatant device to circumvent the express congressional prohibitions against an
1989] 645
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this analysis, the dissent found that Drexel had acquired a beneficial in-
terest in Acquisition by becoming a "critical player" in the tender offer
strategy, receiving the option to purchase voting stock in Acquisition,
and receiving substantial advisory fees. 4 8
In addition, the dissent stated that a public shareholder cannot
make an informed decision to tender or retain shares solicited in a
tender offer without adequate information about those persons making
the offer. 49 Judge Weis suggested that a significant factor in the share-
holder's decision would be the financial condition of the bidder.50
Where a bidder is well-financed, the shareholder might want to hold its
shares, speculating that if the tender offer is only partially successful, the
bidder would subsequently increase its bid.5 ' Conversely, where the
bidder is poorly financed, a shareholder may tender its stock to avoid
remaining as a shareholder in a company whose control has fallen into
"irresponsible hands."' 52
Furthermore, the dissent rejected the requirement enunciated by
various district courts that the bidder control or dominate the tender
offer in order to be subject to the disclosure requirements of the Wil-
liams Act. 53 Instead, the dissent read the Williams Act to require disclo-
sure "by all parties who combine to make an offer."' 54 The dissent
undisclosed party 'indirectly' acquiring beneficial ownership." Id. (Weis, J.,
dissenting).
48. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished the situation where
an entity is both a strategist and equity partner in the tender offer, from the
typical bank financing arrangement where there is a fixed rate of return. Id.
(Weis, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, Drexel went beyond lending,
and was actually a partner in the venture. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent
compared Drexel's equity holdings with that of the Rales brothers. The court
noted that if the Rales brothers voted together they could out-vote Drexel; how-
ever, there was no guarantee that the Rales brothers would vote together. Id.
(Weis, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 67 (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing WILLIAMS ACT LEcISt.axIVE His-
TORY, supra note 2, at 2812) (purpose of Williams Act is to provide shareholders
with material information about tender offer). For the text of the House Report
and a further discussion of the purpose of the Williams Act, see supra notes 1-2
and accompanying text.
50. CitY Capital, 860 F.2d at 67 (Weis, J., dissenting) ("[I1n the case of a
partial tender, a shareholder must weigh staying with the company and tile bid-
der as part of the minority bloc, a decision in which the bidder's financial condi-
tion may be quite significant.").
51. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing Prudent Real Estate Trust v.Johncamp
Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140, 1147 (2d Cir. 1979)).
52. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting) (quoting Prudent Real EsIate Trust, 599 F.2d at
1147).
53. Id. at 68 (Weis, 1., dissenting). For a list of district court cases relying
on the degree of control or ability to dominate the tender otler to determine
whether an entity is a bidder, see supra note 6.
54. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 68 (WeisJ., dissenting). Judge Weis stated that
"I nlothing in the Act indicates that Congress intended that only an entity or
individual that 'dominates' or 'controls' the group making a tender offer is
hound by the disclosure requirements." Id. (Weis,,J., dissenting). This dissent
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stated that the legislative history of the Act focused on all members of
the offering group, not merely the entity which dominated the group. 55
Moreover, the dissent concluded that where there is any doubt as to
whether a person or entity should have made the disclosures, the court
should favor disclosure to protect shareholders and fulfill the purpose of
the Act. 56
III. ANALYSIS
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's interpretation of the term
"bidder" in City Capital is too narrow to give full effect to the congres-
sional purpose underlying the Williams Act. 5 7 Congress intended to
provide the shareholders of a target corporation with material informa-
tion about the tender offer, including financial information about the
principal offerors. 58 By refusing to look behind the facade of an acquisi-
tion vehicle, the City Capital decision allows some of the principal partici-
pants in a tender offer to avoid the disclosures required of a bidder, and
thereby denies public shareholders vital investment information. 591
The majority's construction of the term "bidder" was based on an
inferred SEC interpretation of rule 14d-1 (b)(1) found in Item 9, which is
argued that it is better to err on the side of disclosure than to risk inadequate
disclosure. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent feared that if all
members of a group were not required to make disclosures, "shell" corporations
might be created for the purpose of evading the requirements of the Williams
Act. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 66 (Weis,J., dissenting). In addition to the legislative history, the
dissent interpreted a 1979 SEC Release which used the term "principal partici-
pants" to describe both the "bidder" and the "subject company" in the tender
offer. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting) (interpreting Exchange Act Release No. 15,548.
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,935 at 81,216 (Feb. 5.
1979)). For a further discussion of the SEC Release, see infra note 63 and ac-
companying text.
56. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 68 (Weis, J., dissenting) ("Excess information
may well be harmless, but inadequate disclosure could be disastrous to the
shareholder.").
57. The majority's interpretation of the definition of a bidder did not in-
clude the stockholder of an acquisition vehicle. Id. at 64. However, the majority
did state that an entity in control of the bidder would be required to make the
same disclosures as the bidder if such information would be material to the tar-
get's shareholders. Id. at 65. For a discussion of the congressional purpose in
enacting the Williams Act, see supra note 2.
58. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 66-67 (Weis. J., dissenting) (citing WILLIAMS
ACm, LEGISIATI'E HisTORY, supra note 2, at 2818). The House Report on the
Williams Act stated that "ItIhis provision is designed to obtain full disclosure of
the identity of any person or group obtaining the benefits of ownership of secur-
ities by reason of any contract, understanding, relationship, agreement, or other
arrangement. Id. (Weis,J., dissenting) (quoting WII.IAMs Acr LEGISA1TI\VE His-
"TORY, supa note 2, at 2818).
59. CitY Capital, 860 F.2d at 69 (Weis,.J., dissenting). The dissent noted that
"the majority's interpretation of Item 9, taken to its logical conclusion, would
suggest that the disclosures made by each of the Rales brothers were gratuitous
.... Id. (W eis.J.., dissenting).
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a filing instruction to Schedule 14D- 1.60 While it is arguable that a court
should give "some weight" to an SEC instruction which interprets a stat-
ute, it is not clear that any weight should be given an instruction where
the court must glean from it an SEC interpretation by inference.' Item
9 was not contemplated by the SEC for that constructional purpose and,
therefore, any deference given the inferred interpretation would be
highly speculative. 62
Furthermore, it is suggested that where there is an express SEC in-
terpretation of the language in question, the express interpretation
60. Id. at 64. For the relevant text of rule 14d-l(b)(l) and Item 9, seesupra
notes 5 and 35, respectively.
61. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 68 & n.1 (Weis,J., dissenting). As noted by the
Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Counsel, 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), courts must defer to an agency interpretation where
Congress has not clearly expressed its intent in a statute, so long as the agency
interpretation is reasonable. Therefore, had Item 9 been an instruction directed
toward interpreting the Williams Act, at least some deference would be re-
quired. Here, however, Item 9 is not an interpretation of the Williams Act, but
rather an instruction on how to complete Schedule 14D-1. Thus, the connection
between Item 9 and the Williams Act is too remote to draw an inference about
the SEC's understanding of the term "bidder."
The dissent did not focus on the propriety ofjudicial deference to instruc-
tional administrative interpretations, but rather focused on the construction of
Item 9. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 68 (Weis,J., dissenting). The dissent, however,
was skeptical of the majority's deference to the SEC instruction, stating: "It is
doubtful that 'instructions' on how to complete a form qualify as an administra-
tive construction of a statute so as to be entitled to the deference cited in [Chev-
ron], 467 U.S. 837 or SEC v. Chenerv Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). The
'instructions' are not a reasoned, considered discussion of the statute." City Cap-
ital, 860 F.2d at 68 n.. (Weis, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the dissent's
construction of Item 9, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
The courts have not given deference to administrative instructions where
the agency did not directly address the matter being construed or when its inter-
pretation was in conflict with the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Barter Sys.,
694 F.2d 163, 168 n.12 (8th Cir. 1982) (instructions in IRS' Manual Supplement
not entitled to deference where they do not speak to issue presented); Morris v.
Morrow, 594 F. Supp. 112, 117 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (no deference to instructions
from United States Department of Health and Human Services where interpre-
tation clearly inconsistent with statute). Even where the instruction was inter-
pretive of the statute, the courts have shown less deference than with an
administrative rule. See West Coast Constr. v. Oceano Sanitary Dist., 311 F.
Supp. 378, 383 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (FHA instruction not given same deference as
administrative rule, but rather "some weight").
However, when an instruction is declared by a governmental department as
opposed to an administrative agency, courts have 'used the instruction to sup-
port its interpretation of a statute passed by Congress. See, e.g., United States v.
Sanchez Vasquez, 585 F. Supp. 990, 993 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (district court sup-
ported its interpretation of term 'financial institution' with Treasury Department
instruction for completing Currency Transaction Report foirm).
62. City 'Capital, 860 F.2d at 68 i. I (Weis, J., dissenting) ("The 'instructions'
are not a reasoned, considered discussion of the statute."). The deference re-
quired by the Chenety decision was premised on the administrative agency's "ap-
preciation of the complexities of the problem." Chene'o, 332 U.S. at 209. For a
discussion of the Che1me oy decision, see upra note 21.
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should be given preference over an inferred interpretation. In a 1979
release, the SEC stated that the term "bidder" was adopted to "provide
short-hand references to the principal participants in a tender offer."
63
This release directly addressed the purpose of the SEC's use of the term
"bidder" in rule 14d-l(b)(1) and should therefore have been the focus
of any judicial interpretation of the SEC rule. 64
It is further submitted that the Third Circuit did not fully explore
the possibility that Drexel was a principal participant in the tender of-
fer.65 While the court stated that there was no indication that Drexel
exercised any control over the tender offer, it is suggested that a finding
of control should not be a mechanical determination based solely on the
ownership of a majority interest in the acquisition vehicle or on the right
to representation on the acquisition vehicle's board of directors. 66 The
inquiry to determine "on whose behalf a tender offer is made" 67 is nec-
63. Exchange Act Release No. 15,548, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,935, at 81,216 (Feb. 5, 1979) (emphasis added). There are two
possible readings of the term "principal participants." As the dissent noted,
"[iut is significant that in using the term 'principal participants' the SEC Release
was referring to both the bidder and the subject company-not the bidder alone.
There is no basis to infer that 'principal participants' applies to only some of the
'bidders.' " City Capital, 860 F.2d at 66 (Weis, J., dissenting). Another possible
reading of the release could be that the plural use of the term "participants"
referred to a single bidder and the subject company only.
64. Where implied and expressed administrative interpretations appear in-
consistent, the court should attempt to reconcile their possible meanings. The
approach used in Gray Drug Stores v. Simmons, 522 F. Supp. 961, 966 (N.D.
Ohio 1981) first determined those entities who were controlling entities for the
purposes of Item 9, and then attempted to determine "on whose behalf" the
tender offer was made. Id. The court then used the 1979 SEC Release defining
the term "bidder" as a short-hand reference to the "principal participants in a
tender offer" to interpret the language that a bidder is a person "on whose be-
half a tender offer is made." Id. Under the facts of Gray Drug, the court con-
cluded that an acquiring corporation's right to transfer some of the tendered
shares to its affiliates, standing alone, is not enough to determine that the tender
offer was made "on behalf" of the affiliates and, therefore, only the actual pur-
chaser was a "principal participant." Id. at 967.
65. The concept of a principal participant is analogous to the "primary mo-
tivating force" language used in a number of district court cases. For a list of
district court cases focusing on what constitutes a primary motivating force, see
supra note 6.
66. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 63. The determination of control in the context
of a tender offer should be predicated on a number of factors. Some factors
provided by the court in Koppers Co. v. American Express, 689 F. Supp. 1371
(W.D. Pa. 1988), include: the amount of cash invested in the acquisition corpo-
ration, the stage at which the person became involved in the tender offer, the
degree of equity holdings acquired in the acquisition vehicle, and the large fees
received or expected by the person. See also Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 698 F.
Supp. 1169, 1177 (D. Del. 1988) ("holdings on this issue have been quite fact-
specific"). For a discussion of the Koppers case, see supra notes 27-29.
67. The language "on whose behalf a tender offer is made" is found at 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(b)(l) (1988) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1988) (General
Instruction (G)). For the text of these rules, see supra note 5.
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essarily predicated on the actor's degree of participation in the tender
offer./s One method of determining the degree of participation which a
financial advisor has attained in a tender offer is to evaluate the risks
facing the advisor by virtue of its involvement in the tender offer."" 1
An analysis of the level of risk to the advisor would enable the court
to draw a line between an entity which is merely receiving compensation
for its advisory services and an entity which is taking a proprietary risk
and actively participating in the takeover. 70 Drexel's participation in the
tender offer involved substantial risks. For instance, Drexel had agreed
to provide a large part of the financing required for the tender offer
through the sale of Acquisition preferred stock. 7 1 When Drexel was un-
able to obtain enough outside support for the stock, Drexel itself was
committed to purchase preferred stock for over $609 million.7 2 This
68. The district court cases which have focused on the issue of when a fi-
nancial advisor in a tender offer becomes a "bidder" have analyzed the degree of
participation by the advisor. The first case which addressed the issue in the con-
text of a financial advisor was Koppers, which was decided only six months before
City Capital. In Koppers, the court stated that "the SEC's distinction between 'bid-
ders and the rest of humanity is not subtle, but rather is used to make a simple
differentiation between those who are central to the offer and those who are
not.' " Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1388 (quoting Van Dusen Air, Inc. v. APL Ltd.
Partnership, No. 4-85-1256, slip op. at 4 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 1985)). In Polaroid
Corp. v. Disney, 698 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Del. 1988), decided one month after Cit'
Capital, Drexel and a co-dealer manager were involved in a tender offer transac-
tion similar to that in City Capital. The Polaroid court stated that "[a]n entity is a
bidder only if it directly capitalizes the acquisition vehicle and was consequently
to receive some control over the common stock, or if it was a principal in the
takeover plan." Id. at 1177-78 (citations omitted). Therefore, the degree of par-
ticipation by the financial advisor and dealer manager in a tender offer remains
an element of the definition of a bidder.
69. Cit, Capital, 860 F.2d at 69 (Weis, J., dissenting). In City Capital, the
dissent alluded to a kind of risk analysis in its discussion of who i's a beneficial
owner. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent contrasted a loan transaction,
where the return on investment was fixed, with Drexel's potential equity position
and overall involvement in the tender offer, which was closer to that of a partner.
Id. (Weis,J., dissenting). See also Polaroid Corp., 698 F. Supp. at 1177 ("An entity
is a bidder only if it directly capitalizes the acquisition vehicle.").
70. City Capital, 860 F.2d at 69 (Weis,J., dissenting). The investment risk to
a lender is significantly less than that to an equity owner due to preferential
treatment in the event of liquidation. Also, a lender may have less input into the
strategy of the tender offer. The dissent stated that "[t]he present situatioln is
quite different from one in which a lending institution enters into an agreement
where it seeks the return of the amount it had loaned with interest." Id. (Weis,
J., dissenting). See also Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, 621 F. Supp. 804, 817 (D.,
Del. 1985) (Chemical Bank, as lender of funds to finance tender offer, held not
bidder).
71. Cit' Capital, 860 F.2d at 62.
72. Id. at 62 n.l & 69-70 (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
Apparently, Drexel Burnham was unable to secure outside support for
a substantial part of the financing it had pledged to provide. As a re-
sult, in the Second Supplement to the tender offer dated October 4,
1988, the following statement appears: "The Purchaser [Acquisition]
also has received a commitment letter, dated as ofSeptember 26, 1988
650
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commitment left Drexel with a substantial financial risk in the tender
offer, far exceeding the risks ordinarily undertaken by a financial advisor
or dealer manager.
73
Practicality requires the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
classify all minority shareholders of a corporation initiating a tender of-
fer as bidders.7 4 However, where the nominal bidder is merely an ac-
quisition vehicle created for the sole purpose of receiving the target's
tendered shares, the argument against having minority shareholders
make the Williams Act disclosures is not persuasive. 7 5 A distinction
should be drawn between a corporation whose primary purpose is mak-
ing the tender offer (i.e., an acquisition vehicle) and a corporation which
is making a tender offer incident to its business operations. 76 When an
acquisition vehicle makes a tender offer, it is directly made "on behalf"
of its equity shareholders.
7 7
('Group's Commitment Letter') from the Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group Inc. whereby Group has agreed to purchase an aggregate of
$609.685 million of Series A Stock and Series B Stock ('Group's
Commitment')."
Id. at 69-70 (Weis, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 62. The $609.685 million represents more than one-half of the
total amount Drexel was committed to raise through the sale of the preferred
stock and approximately 24% of the financing required for the entire tender
offer. Id. For a discussion of the traditional role played by a dealer manager, see
supra note 10.
74. Of course, where there are numerous minority shareholders who do not
take an active role in the tender offer, the disclosures would be immaterial to a
target shareholder's decision to tender his shares. Therefore, such disclosures
would not be required under the Williams Act. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100
(1988) (Item 10 requires disclosures only if material to security holder's decision
to sell, tender, or hold its securities).
75. The disclosure needs of the target's shareholders are different when the
offer is made by an acquisition vehicle as opposed to a company with actual
operations. A clear example of this distinction can be seen in the case of the
partial tender offer, where only some of the target shareholder's stock is
purchased, leaving the shareholder with an interest in the target company. In
this situation, the shareholder cannot look to the financial statements of the ac-
quisition vehicle to determine if it has the ability to operate the company suc-
cessfully, because the acquisition vehicle has no track record. See WILLIAMS ACT
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 2812 (in partial tender offer, shareholder
remains as investor under new management "he has helped to install without
knowing whether it will be good or bad for the company").
76. There is a distinction between a minority shareholder in a functioning
corporation and a minority shareholder in an acquisition vehicle. The former's
beneficial interest is primarily in the operations of the acquiring company with
an indirect benefit derived from the tender offer through synergism, economies
of scale, vertical integration or other possible efficiencies. Cf W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1089 (6th ed. 1988). The
latter's beneficial interest is derived directly and only from the success of the
tender offer. If the tender offer fails, the corporate shell itself is worthless as a
going concern, and its value then becomes the exploitation of an inflated market
price for the tendered shares acquired by the shell, fueled by speculation about
the takeover attempt.
77. It is clear that there would be no reason to invest in a corporation cre-
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Finally, it is submitted that the Third Circuit incorrectly distin-
guished the Koppers Co. v. American Express78 decision. The minimal de-
gree of representation which Shearson had on the Board of BNS, Inc.,
the acquisition vehicle in Koppers, was insufficient to make a meaningful
distinction between the cases. 79 This point can be demonstrated
through an examination of the relative voting rights and powers pos-
sessed by the three classes of stock in BNS, Inc. 80 The Class A and Class
B common shareholders each had the right to elect two directors; the
Class C Shreholders could not elect any directors. 8 1 The two directors
elected by the Class A shareholders each had three votes, while each of
the Class B directors were entitled to only one vote.8 2 In addition, the
Class A shareholders were entitled to four votes, as compared to only
one for Class B shareholders and none for the Class C shareholders,
when voting on matters other than the election or removal of direc-
tors. 83 Moreover, each of the Class B shareholders had waived his right
to enforce any fiduciary duty on the part of the Class A shareholder or
directors for at least six years.8 4 Therefore, Shearson's right to elect
two board members may have been one of a number of factors which the
Koppers court used to determine that Shearson was a bidder; however, it
ated for the sole purpose of making a tender offer without the expectation that
the tender offer will be made "on behalf" of the acquisition corporation's
shareholders.
78. 689 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1988). The City Capital court distinguished
Koppers on the basis that Shearson, by virtue of its Class B stock ownership, was
able to elect two directors to the board of directors of the acquisition vehicle.
See City Capital, 860 F.2d at 63 n.5 (determining that Koppers decision was
founded on Shearson's sharing of control of board). In Polaroid Corp. v. Dis-
ney, 698 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Del. 1988), Koppers was distinguished based on
Shearson's contribution of "more than $23 million to the acquiring partnership
prior to the tender offer." Polaroid, 698 F. Supp. at 1179. The court also pointed
to Shearson's near 50% interest in the acquisition vehicle. Id. (quoting Koppers,
689 F. Supp. at 1390).
79. The Koppers court estimated that approximately 80% of the voting
power of the common stock remained in the one Class A shareholder (a non-
Shearson interest), even though one-half of the board was appointed by Shear-
son. See Koppers, 689 F. Supp. at 1385 (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 1384. In Koppers, there were three shareholders of the acquisition
vehicle, BNS, Inc. Id. at 1376. Bright Aggregates, which was wholly-owned by
Beazer PLC ("Beazer"), owned .490 shares of BNS which was all of its outstand-
ing Class A shares. Id. at 1376 & 1385. SL-Merger, a wholly owned subsidiary
of Shearson, held .461 Class B shares, with the remaining .024 Class B shares
outstanding held by Speedward, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of Na-
tional Westminster Investment Bank Limited. Id. at 1377 & 1385. Speedward
held all of the Class C stock. Id. at 1385.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Moreover, the Class B shares had to be voted in the same manner as
the Class A shares. Id.
84. Id. at 1389-90. There was also a stock transfer restriction on Shearson's
interest in the acquisition vehicle. Id. at 1389.
652 [Vol. 34: p. 635
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does not appear to have been a significant factor.8 "5 The emphasis of the
Koppers court appeared to be on Shearson's "formation and capitaliza-
tion" of the acquisition vehicle and not on its minimal board
representation .86
IV. CONCLUSION
The ramifications of the Third Circuit's decision in City Capital are
threefold. First, shareholders who are confronted with a tender offer
may have to make their investment decision without the benefit of full
disclosure, thereby frustrating the purpose of the Williams Act.8 7 Sec-
ond, this ruling will allow those persons who do not wish to disclose
material information, for whatever reasons, to evade the requirements
of the Williams Act by using an acquisition vehicle. 88 Finally, the SEC's
ability to monitor the tender offer for violations of the securities laws
will be impaired.8 9 Given the adverse effects of the Third Circuit's nar-
row definition of the term "bidder," the City Capital decision fails to ful-
fill the intent of Congress in its enactment of the Williams Act.90 Since
the City Capital decision was premised on giving deference to an inferred
SEC interpretation of the term "bidder," it would be appropriate for the
85. The Koppers court responded to Shearson's argument that its voting
power was insignificant as compared to the Class A shareholder's by stating that
"the limited voting does not change the result that Shearson is one of the enti-
ties on whose behalf the tender offer is made." Id. at 1390.
86. Id.
87. The stated purpose of the Williams Act was to protect shareholders
solicited in a cash tender offer. For a comprehensive discussion of the purpose
of the Williams Act, see supra notes 1-2.
88. As noted by the dissent, the SEC feared that the wording of the proviso
in Item 9 might be used to avoid the Williams Act disclosures. The SEC stated
that it would not permit the use of a shell corporation to evade filing require-
ments. See City Capital, 860 F.2d at 69 (Weis,J., dissenting) (citing Securities Act
Release No. 58444 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,256
at 88,380 (July 21, 1977)). For a discussion ofJudge Weis' interpretation of the
SEC Release, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
89. For instance, when a multi-service securities firm undertakes to perform
a number of roles in a single tender offer transaction, there is the potential for
conflicts of interest to arise. SeeJ. McLaughlin, Counselling the Miulti-Ser'ice Securi-
ties Firm, 576 PRAC. L. INST. 515, 517-18 (1987). The Koppers court addressed
this issue in its discussion of Schedule 14D-l, Item 10(b). Koppers, 689 F. Supp.
at 1391. The court stated that "[tihe relationship between brokers/dealers and
their clients is not that of an ordinary merchant to his customer; strict standards
of a fiduciary must be adhered to by the dealer." Id. (citing S. JAFFE, BROKERS-
DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS § 7.01 (1978)). Without disclosures by the
broker-dealer, these conflicts of interest may be difficult for the SEC to uncover.
90. For a discussion of the congressional purpose underlying the enact-
ment of the Williams Act, see supra notes 1-2.
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SEC to issue a clarifying statement delineating the scope of the "bidder"
definition under rule 14d- 1(b)(1). '
EdwardJ. Yocum, Jr.
91. On March 6, 1989, the SEC published a notice of proposed revisions to
the instructions under certain schedules filed in control transactions. 54 Fed.
Reg. 10,360 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed Mar. 13,
1989). The proposed revisions would require
responses to specified items of the schedules relating to the identity,
background, funding, and purposes of the filing person with respect to
each person who (i) contributes more than 10 percent of the equity
capital or (ii) has the right to receive, in the aggregate, more than 10
percent of the profits or assets upon liquidation or dissolution of the
filing person.
Id. at 10,331.
Under the current instructions, an acquisition vehicle could be created with
a limited partnership, or closely-held entity identified as the control person. Id.
at 10,362. With such a scheme, only the general partners would be required to
make certain disclosures. Id. The proposed revisions would prevent the ability
to legally avoid the disclosure requirements through the use of an acquisition
vehicle, by focusing the disclosure requirements on "substantial equity partici-
pants" rather than "control persons." Id. As noted by the SEC, substantial eq-
uity participants are often "the persons actually financing, benefiting from and,
in some instances, structuring the transaction." Id. (citing City Capital, 860 F.2d
at 64).
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